CJAD 415 - Discussions; General Description For your initial posts, make sure that you answer each part of the discussion promptly with a thorough, original response. Each initial post should

have a minimum of 8-10 sentences. At least two references are required for each initial post. Be sure to provide APA in-text citations (including Page Numbers) for all resources. 1) Textbook reference excerpts with page numbers are provided. 2) In addition to textbook excerpts, At least ONE Outside reference with citation including page number is required. Outside reference: Tudor's choice 3) At least 190 words 4) I request Rohan MO, if available. 5) Prag report (only) needed for discussions Rubric: 1) Post is well developed, fully addresses, and develops all aspects of discussion or reflection. 2) The initial post should be at least 8-10 well developed sentences. 3) At least two references or resources Are used for each initial post. Provides accurate APA in-text citations for all resources./n Discussion 7 instructions, textbook excerpts with page numbers In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court endorsed police stop and frisk. The court held that relying solely on Wardlow fleeing would have been invalid and the evidence seized would have been inadmissible. But the police pointed to the fact that their search of Wardlow occurred in a “high-crime area” and that was good enough for the Supreme Court. Studies have shown there are more "hot spots" as opposed to whole areas in the community. What are your thoughts, even as you look at your own communities? Has the term “high-crime area" become a wild card for increased police use of stop and frisk? Textbook citation: Carmen, R.V. D., & Hemmens, C. (2016). Criminal Procedure: Law and Practice (10th ed.). Cengage Limited. https://ccis.vitalsource.com/books/9781337472395 Page 118: ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW (2000) Presence in a high-crime area, combined with unprovoked flight upon observing police officers, gives officers sufficient grounds to investigate to further determine if criminal activity is about to take place. Page 126 - 127: Does Unprovoked Flight Constitute Reasonable Suspicion? The Court has held that unprovoked flight upon observing police officers may constitute reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop (Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 [2000]). In Wardlow, the respondent had fled upon seeing a caravan of police motor vehicles converge in an area in Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking. A police officer stopped him and then conducted a frisk for weapons because, in the officer's experience, weapons were involved in the sale of narcotics in that area. The officer found a handgun and arrested Wardlow. Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) On appeal of his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, Wardlow maintained that the stop was invalid because his unprovoked flight upon seeing the police did not in itself constitute reasonable suspicion. The Court disagreed, holding that the action by the officer was valid because the flight constituted reasonable suspicion and therefore justified the stop. (The frisk itself was not an issue in the case, the assumption being that the subsequent frisk was valid.) The unprovoked flight in Wardlow took place in an urban area of heavy narcotics trafficking. Would the Court have decided differently had the unprovoked flight occurred in an affluent suburb or in any other place not known for drug trafficking? The Court decision is unclear on this issue. Instead, the Court said: "Headlong flight—wherever it occurs is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such." The Court then added that “the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Responding to the argument by Wardlow that the flight from the police was in itself an innocent act, the Court said: "Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation." Thus the Court placed great emphasis on the unprovoked flight itself but then also mentioned the locale, saying: "In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent's presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers' suspicion but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police." Given this language and the Court's lack of a categorical statement, lower courts have rendered conflicting decisions on the issue of whether or not unprovoked flight alone, in the absence of other circumstances, constitutes reasonable suspicion. That issue may have to be clarified by the Court. Are Stops Based on Hearsay Information Valid? An investigative stop based on secondhand or hearsay information is valid. For example, in one case a police officer on patrol in a high-crime area received a tip from a person known to the officer that a suspect was carrying narcotics and had a gun. The officer approached the suspect's parked automobile and ordered him to step out. When the suspect responded by rolling down his window, the officer reached into the car and removed a loaded pistol from the suspect's waistband. The suspect was then arrested, and a subsequent search of the car led to the recovery of additional weapons and a substantial quantity of heroin. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that a stop and frisk cannot be based on secondhand information, saying that the information from the known informant "carried enough indicia of reliability to justify" the forcible stop of the suspect (Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 [1972]). Adams v. Williams (1972) Page 128: Are Stops Based on Anonymous Tips Valid? The preceding case, Adams v. Williams, involved information obtained by the police from a known informant. But what if the tip is anonymous? The Court has ruled that an anonymous tip, corroborated by independent police work, may provide reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop if it carries sufficient indicia of reliability (Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 [1990]). In this case, the police received an anonymous telephone tip that a woman named White would leave a certain apartment at 3:00 P.M. in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken tail light, that she would be going to Dobey's Motel, and that she would have cocaine in a brown attaché case. The police immediately proceeded to the apartment building, where they saw a vehicle matching the anonymous caller's description. They then observed White leaving the building and driving the vehicle. The police followed her to Dobey's Motel, where she consented to a search of her vehicle, which revealed marijuana. White was then arrested; a subsequent search found cocaine in her purse. She was tried and convicted. On appeal, she sought suppression of the evidence, alleging that the search was illegal because the stop was not based on reasonable suspicion. The Court disagreed, saying that “standing alone, the tip here is completely lacking in the necessary indicia of reliability, since it provides virtually nothing from which one might conclude that the caller is honest or his information reliable and gave no indication of the basis for his predictions regarding White's criminal activities." However, "although it is a close question, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that significant aspects of the informant's story were sufficiently corroborated by the police to furnish reasonable suspicion.” HIGHLIGHT Reasonable Suspicion as a Requirement in Policing "Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.... Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors quantity and quality are considered in the 'totality of the circumstances the whole picture."" Source: Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)