strategy profile chosen in period 1 and then play the prisoner's dilemma again in period 2. Suppose that the total utility of each player is given by the sum of the realized utilities in each period. For example, if (C1, D2) was chosen in period 1and (D1, C2) is chosen in period 2, then player 1's utility is – 1 + 2 = 1 while player 2's utility is2 + (– 1) = 1. Part a: Write out the whole extensive form of this game in which the prisoner's dilemma is played twice in succession. Part b: How many subgames does this extensive from game have? Write out all of the subgames. Part c: Solve for all of the SPNE of this game.
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