2/7/24, 9:48 PM A 'humanely' killed animal is still killed - and that's wrong | Aeon Ideas A 'humanely' killed animal is still killed - and that's wrong Anna E

Charlton is adjunct professor of law at Rutgers University and the co-founder of the Rutgers Animal Rights Law Clinic. Her latest book, together with Gary L Francione, is Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach (2015). Gary L Francione is Board of Governors Professor of Law at Rutgers University School of Law in New Jersey, US; visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Lincoln, UK; and honorary professor of philosophy at the University of East Anglia, UK. His most recent book is Why Veganism Matters: The Moral Value of Animals (2021). Edited by Nigel Warburton Western conventional wisdom about animal ethics is that killing an animal is not the problem; the problem is making the animal suffer. As long as we have treated and killed an animal in a ‘humane' way, we have done nothing wrong. A compelling example of this belief is found in the case of dogs and cats, animals particularly valued in Western culture. If someone inflicts suffering on a dog or cat, they are excoriated. But unwanted dogs and cats are routinely ‘put to sleep' – killed — in shelters with an intravenous injection of sodium pentobarbital, and most people do not object as long as the process is administered properly by a trained person and there is no suffering inflicted on the animal. - Why do we think that killing animals per se is not morally wrong? Why do we think that death is not a harm for non-human animals? https://aeon.co/ideas/a-humanely-killed-animal-is-still-killed-and-thats-wrong 1/4 2/7/24, 9:48 PM A 'humanely' killed animal is still killed - and that's wrong | Aeon Ideas Before the 19th century, animals were mostly regarded as things. Neither our use nor our treatment of them mattered morally or legally. We could have obligations that concerned animals, such as an obligation not to damage our neighbour's cow, but that obligation was owed to our neighbour as the owner of the cow, to the cow. not To say that we thought of animals as things didn't mean that we denied that they were sentient, or subjectively aware, and had interests in not experiencing pain, suffering or distress. But we believed that we could ignore those interests because animals were our inferiors. We could reason; they couldn't. We could use symbolic communication; they couldn't. In the 19th century, a paradigm shift occurred, and the animal welfare theory was born. In a relatively brief period of time as far as major shifts in thinking go, we claimed to reject the notion of animals as things, and to embrace the idea that animals had moral value. Prominent in this paradigm shift was the lawyer/philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who argued in 1789 that, although a full- grown horse or dog is more rational and more able to communicate than a human infant, 'the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?' - Bentham maintained that the fact that animals were cognitively different from humans – that they had different sorts of minds – did not mean that their suffering did not matter morally. He argued that we could no more morally justify ignoring the suffering of animals based on their species than we could ignore the suffering of slaves based on their skin colour. But Bentham did not advocate that we stop using animals as resources in the manner he had advocated abolition in the case of human slavery. He maintained that it was morally acceptable to use and kill animals for human purposes as long as we treated them well. According to Bentham, animals live in the present and are not aware of what they lose when we take their lives. If we kill and eat them, ‘we are the better for it, and they are never the worse. They have none of those long-protracted anticipations of future misery which we have.' Bentham https://aeon.co/ideas/a-humanely-killed-animal-is-still-killed-and-thats-wrong 2/4 2/7/24, 9:48 PM A 'humanely' killed animal is still killed - and that's wrong | Aeon Ideas maintained that we actually do animals a favour by killing them, as long as we do so in a relatively painless manner: ‘The death they suffer in our hands commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course of nature ... [W]e should be the worse for their living, and they are never the worse for being dead.' In other words, the cow does not care that we kill and eat her; she cares only about how we treat and kill her, and her only interest is not to suffer. And that is precisely what most of us believe today. Killing animals is not the problem. The problem is making them suffer. If we provide a reasonably pleasant life and a relatively painless death, we have done nothing wrong. Interestingly, Bentham's views are endorsed by Peter Singer, who bases the position he articulates in Animal Liberation (1975) squarely on Bentham. Singer claims that 'the absence of some form of mental continuity' makes it difficult to understand why killing an animal is not ‘made good by the creation of a new animal who will lead an equally pleasant life'. We think that this view is wrong. To say that a sentient being – any sentient being – is not harmed by death is decidedly odd. Sentience is not a characteristic that has evolved to serve as an end in itself. Rather, it is a trait that allows the beings who have it to identify situations that are harmful and that threaten survival. Sentience is a means to the end of continued existence. Sentient beings, by virtue of their being sentient, have an interest in remaining alive; that is, they prefer, want or desire to remain alive. Continued existence is in their interest. Therefore, to say that a sentient being is not harmed by death denies that the being has the very interest that sentience serves to perpetuate. It would be analogous to saying that a being with eyes does not have an interest in continuing to see or is not harmed by being made blind. Animals in traps will chew their paws or limbs off and thereby inflict excruciating suffering on themselves in order to continue to live. Singer recognises that 'an animal may struggle against a threat to its life', but he concludes that this does not mean that the animal has the mental continuity required for a sense of self. This position begs the question, however, in that it https://aeon.co/ideas/a-humanely-killed-animal-is-still-killed-and-thats-wrong 3/4 44 2/7/24, 9:48 PM A 'humanely' killed animal is still killed - and that's wrong | Aeon Ideas assumes that the only way that an animal can be self-aware is to have the sort of autobiographical sense of self that we associate with normal adult humans. That is certainly one way of being self-aware, but it is not the only way. As the biologist Donald Griffin, one of the most important cognitive ethologists of the 20th century, noted, it is arbitrary to deny animals some sort of self-awareness given that animals who are perceptually conscious must be aware of their own bodies and actions, and must see them as different from the bodies and actions of other animals. Even if animals live in the ‘eternal present' that Bentham and Singer think they inhabit, that does not mean that they are not self-aware or that they do not have an interest in continued existence. Animals would still be aware of themselves in each instant of time and have an interest in perpetuating that awareness; they would have an interest in getting to the next second of consciousness. Humans who have a particular form of amnesia might be unable to recall memories or engage in ideation about the future, but that does not mean that they are not self- aware in each moment, or that the cessation of that awareness would not be a harm. - It is time that we rethink this issue. If we saw killing an animal – however painlessly as raising a moral issue, perhaps that might lead us to start thinking more of whether animal use is morally justifiable, rather than only whether treatment is ‘humane’. Given that animals are property, and we generally protect animal interests only to the extent that it is cost-effective, it is a fantasy to think that ‘humane' treatment is an attainable standard in any case. So if we take animal interests seriously, we really cannot avoid thinking about the morality of use totally apart from considerations of treatment. aeon.co https://aeon.co/ideas/a-humanely-killed-animal-is-still-killed-and-thats-wrong 8 September 2017 4/4/n Critical Analysis Rubric Overview: Pick one of the two paper (sets) we read for class. Write a brief paper (2 pages) summarizing, reconstructing, and critiquing this paper. Then, present your critique to the class in Week 11. (Option for an extended presentation for extra credit). Grading Criteria: 10 possible points. Steps You will be graded for: О Section 1 & 2: accuracy in answering questions and reconstructing arguments Section 3: Persuasiveness of your negative argument. Is your conclusion clearly stated and supported by reasons? Overall: Clearity, conciseness, reasonably correct grammar, and correct format. • Step 1: Pick one of the following papers that we read о Option 1: "Through the eyes of another" by Heidi Maiborn (9 pages) Read also pages 1-5 of Singer's "All Animals are Equal." Option 2: "A Humanely Killed Animal" by Charlton & Francoin (4 pages) ◉ Step 2: Create an outline (week 7) • Step 3: Draft your paper (in class, week 8) • • • ○ ICE 7: draft paper Step 4: Peer Review & Revision (in class, week 9). ICE 8: peer review Step 5: Type, proofread ONLY, submit (Saturday by 11:59, March 9 on Omnivox) Value: 15% о ○ *The only work you will do on this paper outside class is proofreading and typing your final draft. Changes beyond that will not be graded and may result in a zero* Step 6: Develop a presentation that focuses on and expands part 3 of your paper: 3 mins + question. ○ ○ Option for an extended presentation +5pts (discussed in week 9) Step 7: Present your paper on our last class (week 11). о Value: 5% (optional additional 5%) Paper Structure & Requirements: Format: Times new roman, 12pt font, double spaced, 2 pages. PDF only • Introduction: State your author's thesis and a snap-shot of their argument. Then, state your own thesis: what you will be arguing for (in your critique). 3 sentences max. Part 1: Summarize & reconstruct your author's argument. ○ Step 1: Summary: give an overview of the author's paper. О Step 2: Reconstruction: reconstruct in standard form the author's argument. State, in one sentence, if you think the argument succeeds, fails, or is flawed/incomplete. ● Part 2: Important Details ● ● ○ Answer a specific question about the paper (provided in week 8). Part 3: Critique the author's argument О *This is the most important and challenging part of the paper. To do it well will ○ ○ require you to have accurately reconstructed the argument in Part 1. Step 1: Ask and answer the following questions: ◉ A. If the author's premises are true, do they support / guarantee the conclusion? B. Are the premises actually true? • Note: There are two possibilities here. You think: о о 1. The author's argument succeeds. If so, be creative. Think of how an opponent would argue against the view (play "Devil's advocate). Then, say how you would respond to this opponent. Even if you think the argument works and the conclusion is true, how could you make the argument stronger? 2. the author's argument fails. If so, you likely answered “no” to questions A or B above. Explain which premise is false, or why the premises still fail to ensure the truth of the conclusion. Example: Do you have a counter-example (a case where the premises are true but the conclusion false)? Does the author's argument "prove too much" (guide us to a conclusion we cannot accept)? Be specific. Step 2: Briefly (2 sentences) state your own, original view on this topic. If you think the author's conclusion is wrong, what should we believe instead? If you think the author's conclusion is right, what are the implications? What could you argue for on the basis of this conclusion? ● Note: The extended option of your presentation will require you to develop this part of your paper. Conclusion: 1-2 sentences summarizing your paper Sample: Critical Analysis of Judith Litchenberg's "Abolish Life Sentences" Introduction In this paper, I'll discuss Judith Litchenberg's article “Abolish Life Sentences," where she argues that prison sentences without parole are unethical. I will then argue that, while I agree with her conclusion, there are stronger consequentialist reasons to oppose life sentences. Part 1: Summary and Reconstruction Litchenberg's article aims to show that life sentences both fail to produce good social consequences (e.g. deterring crime) and produce horrible consequences (e.g. they are expensive, and destroy families). She claims that a retributivist (Kantian) position also fails, arguing that the law of an “eye for an eye" leads to unacceptable conclusions (e.g. the state can “torture the torturer"), and that inmates rarely deserve extreme punishment. She is writing at a time when there are record numbers of prisoners serving life without parole (e.g. 200,000 people in the USA). The author thinks that a world without life sentences would be more optimistic about criminal redemption and lead to greater human flourishing. What follows is a standard form reconstruction of her argument: 1. If life sentences are just, then it is for either consequentialist or Kantian reasons. 2. There are no consequentialist or Kantian reasons for life sentences. 3. Life sentences should be abolished. Part 2: Answer to a Key Question Litchenberg argues that many criminals who are sentenced to life in prison are mentally ill, or suffered neglect and abuse as children. These environmental and psychological features often determine whether one will commit crimes, thus undermining the logic of retribution in the form of life sentences. She acknowledges the objection that by this reasoning we could excuse all crime, as in if we deny free will entirely. However, she responds that we should simply proportion the punishment to the amount of responsibility one exercised, which is often lessened by one's genetics and upbringing. This approach, she thinks, will never amount to life sentences. Part 3: Critique Litchenberg's second premise states that there are no consequentialist reasons or Kantian reasons for life sentences. While I find her rejection of retributivism sound, I think her stance on the consequentialist approach is much weaker. She argues that for the consequentialist view to succeed, life sentences would have to have the positive consequences of deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation. I agree that it's absurd to consider life-sentences as rehabilitative, and it's only trivially true that incarceration prevents crimes outside of prison. What about deterrence? Litchenberg argues that the threat of life-sentences will not deter the many perpetrators who commit impulsive crimes of passion, e.g. the person who murders in a moment of blind rage. She also points to data showing that the older you get, the less likely you are to commit crime (regardless of fear of punishment). I think her view on crimes of passion misses the point. If Joe knows that if he goes to Patty's Pub, he will see his childhood bully, Brock, and fly into a blind rage—the fear of a life sentence for Brock's murder may deter him from leaving home. Thus, he never experiences the passion that would override his fear and drive him to violence. Likewise, the people who do not age-out of crime-psychopaths or generational criminals, are likely the criminals we would want to deter with harsher sentences. Finally, the alternative of a life sentence may convince such criminals to offer valuable information on more powerful, dangerous criminals. The question for a consequentialist is whether the bad results of life sentences outweigh the good. My critique, if correct, tilts the balance in favor of life sentences. Yet, my own view is that life sentences are ultimately immoral, because their results are overwhelmingly negative. Litchenberg lists many such results and here is one more, strong reason that tilts the balance back: the fear of being locked up for life (including for crimes you did not commit), is itself a public harm. One is less free, happy, and secure in society with the knowledge that it is legally