Power in the 21st century Efforts to rein in climate change will up-end the geopolitics of energy The 21st-century energy system promises to be better than the oil age-better for human
health, more politically stable and less econom- ically volatile. The shift involves big risks. If dis- orderly, it could add to political and economic instability in petrostates and concentrate con- trol of the green-supply chain in China. Even more dangerous, it could happen too slowly. Today fossil fuels are the ultimate source of 85% of energy. But this system is dirty. Energy accounts for two- thirds of greenhouse-gas emissions; the pollution from burning fossil fuels kills over 4m people a year, mostly in the emerging world's mega-cities. Oil has also created political instability. For decades petrostates such as Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, with lit- tle incentive to develop their economies, have been mired in the politics of handouts and cronyism. In an effort to ensure secure supplies, the world's big powers have vied to influence these states, not least in the Middle East, where America has roughly 60,000 troops. Fossil fuels cause economic volatility, too. Oil markets are buffeted by an erratic cartel. Concentration of the world's oil reserves makes supply vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Little wonder that the price has swung by over 30% in a sixth-month period 62 times since 1970. ersified, geographically and technologically. Petrostates will have to attempt to reform themselves and, as their governments start to depend on taxing their own citizens, some will become more representative. Consuming countries, which once sought energy security by meddling in the politics of the oil producers, will instead look to sensible regulation of their own power in- dustry. The 21st-century system should also be less economically volatile. Electricity prices will be determined not by a few big ac- tors but by competition and gradual efficiency gains. Yet even as a better energy system emerges, the threat of a poorly managed transition looms. Two risks stand out. Autocrat- ic China could temporarily gain clout over the global power sys- tem because of its dominance in making key components and developing new technologies. E A picture of the new energy system is emerging. With bold ac- tion, renewable electricity such as solar and wind power could rise from 5% of supply today to 25% in 2035, and nearly 50% by 2050. Oil and coal use will drop, although cleaner natural gas will remain central. This architecture will ultimately bring huge benefits. Most important, decarbonising energy will avoid the chaos of unchecked climate change, including devastating droughts, famine, floods and mass dislocation. Once mature, it should be more politically stable, too, because supply will be div- Faced with these dangers, the temptation will be to ease the adjustment, by taking the transition more slowly. However, that would bring about a different, even more destabilising set of cli- mate-related consequences eines China's leverage depends on how fast other economies move (see briefing). Europe is home to giant developers of wind and solar farms-Orsted, Enel and Iberdrola are building such projects around the world. Euro- pean firms are leading the race to cut their own emissions, too. If America were to act on climate change--with, say, a carbon tax and new infra- structure--its capital markets, national energy laboratories and universities would make it a formidable green power. The other big risk is the transition of petrostates, which ac- count for 8% of world GDP and nearly 900m citizens. As oil de- mand dwindles, they will face a vicious fight for market share which will be won by the countries with the cheapest and clean- est crude. And if the shift to- wards fossil-fuel-free renewable energy accelerates, as it must, it will cause even more geopolitical turbulence. The move to a new energy order is vital, but it will be messy.